Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem by F Gjesdal
The Review of Economic Studies Ltd.
Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
Author(s): Frøystein Gjesdal
Source: The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Jul., 1982), pp. 373-390
Published by: The Review of Economic Studies Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2297362
Accessed: 08/12/2010 08:27
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=resl.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The Review of Economic Studies Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
The Review of Economic Studies.
http://www.jstor.orgReview  of Economic  Studies  (1982) XLIX, 373-390  0034-6527/82/00280373$00.50 
?  1982 The Society  for Economic  Analysis  Limited 
Information  and  Incentives: 
The  Agency  Information Problem 
FR0YSTEIN  GJESDAL 
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration 
This  paper  considers  the use of imperfect  information  for  risk  sharing  and  incentive  purposes 
when perfect  observation  of actions  and outcomes  is impossible,  making  complete  contracting 
infeasible. The incentive-insurance  problem  is defined  to consist  of two parts:  the choice of an 
information  system and the design of a sharing rule based on the information  system. A 
generalized  agency model is formulated  to analyse  this problem. The agency  models of Ross 
(1973a, b), Wilson  (1968), Stiglitz  (1974), Mirrlees  (1976), Harris  and Raviv  (1979), Holmstrom 
(1979) a.o. appear  as special  cases of the generalized  model. The analysis  focuses  on the value 
of information  in the agency  information  problem. The set of information  systems  which are 
valuable-i.e. improve  risk  sharing  and  incentives  in a Pareto  sense-is  characterized.  A problem- 
independent  ranking  of information  systems  for  the agency  information  problem  is then  character- 
ized under  the assumption  that the agent's  preferences  are additive  in money and actions. The 
ranking  may be viewed as a generalization  of Blackwell's  ranking  of information  systems  for 
decision problems,  to this particular  game. When the agent's risk preferences  depend on his 
choice of action, on the other hand, it is shown that the Blackwell  ranking  may be invalid. 
Randomized  incentive  schemes are shown to be efficient  when the incentive  effect of risk is 
positive  and sufficiently  large  relative  to the absolute  risk  aversion  of the partners. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The principal-agent model is  a  description of  the  externality which results when 
individuals (agents) make decisions without considering how others (principals)  are 
affected  by their decisions.' As is well known, there exist incentive  mechanisms  which, 
by making  the agent's  remuneration  a function  of his actions,  will induce  Pareto  efficient 
decision making. However, if actions are not costlessly  observable,  such schemes may 
be infeasible  or suboptimal.  This  paper  considers  general  two-part  incentive  mechanisms 
of the following  type. First  an information  system  (control  system,  performance  measure- 
ment system)  is chosen. Then an incentive  scheme  is designed  with  payment  to the agent 
made conditional  on the signal  received  from the information  system. 
This paper  focuses on the first  stage-the  optimal  choice of information  system. In 
Section 3 it will be shown  how information  systems  may be compared  for a given agency 
problem. In particular  the set of valuable  information  systems-those  that are strictly 
preferred  to no information-will be characterized.  More generally  it will be assumed 
that some information  system is costlessly  available,  and the set of marginally  valuable 
information  systems  is then characterized.  Much  of the previous  work on agency  theory 
has primarily  dealt with the second stage of the incentive  mechanism-the design  of the 
incentive  scheme  for a fixed  information  system.  However,  some have  explicitly  discussed 
marginal  value of information  systems,2 albeit for special cases, and others may be 
interpreted  as addressing  aspects  of this  issue as well.3 Section  3 presents  a generalization 
of this work. 
In Section 4 comparisons  of mutually  exclusive  information  systems are discussed. 
A ranking  of information  systems  is characterized  which  does not depend  on the specific 
agency problem, as long as the agent's utility is additive in money and action. This 
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ranking  may  be viewed as a generalization  of Blackwell's  ranking  of experiments  (Black- 
well (1951)).  The generalized Blackwell ranking may prompt some to suggest that 
choosing  an information  system  for the agency  is formally  equivalent  to choosing  informa- 
tion systems in a Bayesian decision problem if the agent's action is taken to be the 
unknown  state of nature  and the incentive  scheme  to be the decision  function. However, 
the agency is a game, and actions are chosen by a player in the game rather than by 
nature. Moreover,  the Blackwell  ranking  is only valid  for a subclass  of agency  problems. 
Leaving this class, randomized  transfer  payments may very well be efficient. This is 
conclusive  evidence that the decision problem  analogy  does not work. It is instructive, 
though,  to see how far it goes, and where it breaks  down. 
The randomization  issue is explored  in Section 5.  The conditions  under  which the 
incentive  effect  of risk  is positive,  are  derived. However,  risk  itself  is negative. Randomiz- 
ation  is shown  to be efficient  only when the net effect  is positive. The section  is concluded 
with an analysis  of the incentive-risk  trade-off  under  randomization. 
In Section 2 the agency model is formulated  and discussed. Section 6 contains 
concluding  remarks. 
2. THE MODEL 
0= {G} and  st  = {a =  (at,...  ,  a,)}  are  the  sets  of  states  and  actions  respectively.  0 
describes  the uncertainty  in the economy  and  d  the decision  alternatives.  A Borel Field 
and a probability  measure  on which  the principal  and the agent agree, are defined  on 0. 
An outcome  function  is a function  X: 0 x d  -  R where  R is the set of real  numbers. 
X  is a random  variable  on 0  for each a.  {x} is the image of X, and is assumed  to be 
finite. x may be interpreted  as money. 
An information  system is a function Y: 0 x d  -*  {y}.  Y is a random  variable  on 0 
for every a.  The set of signals {y} is finite and has cardinality  m. The notation Z  and 
{z}  (cardinality  m') will also be used for an information  system.  If Z  and Y  are 
informative  systems,  the function  (Z, Y) whose image  is {(z, y)}, is an information  system 
as well.  The signals y and z  are observed after the agent has chosen a.  The set of 
information  systems observed by the principal  as well as the agent is denoted  '.  X  is 
always assumed to contain at least one constant function which is referred to as no 
information  and  denoted Y?. A randomization  may  be defined  as an information  system 
which  does not depend  on a, and is statistically  independent  of X  X  may be understood 
to include  randomizations.  However,  randomizations  are a non-issue  as long as Assump- 
tion 4  below is imposed, as  Y? is then preferred to any randomization. A  is the 
information  system which is the identity mapping  of d  into itself for every 0.  When 
A e X,  the action is said to be observable. X  is an information  system as well. When 
X E X  the outcome is observable. 
Information  systems which are included  in X, are assumed  to be costless. On the 
other hand many information  systems which one might want to consider may not be 
contained in k.  The information  system A  is in general excluded. This is certainly 
reasonable  if a is interpreted  as effort. X  may not be included  either. Many risks are 
uninsurable  because the cost of observing  outcomes  is larger  than the value of insuring. 
The cost of auditing  income tax returns  makes  for less than perfect audits. If the agent 
is the manager  of a firm,  he may want to be paid off before the outcome of his actions 
is observed (multiperiod  considerations  such as this one are admittedly  ad hoc as only 
single period models will be considered). Finally,  the cost in a cost-plus  contract  is just 
an imperfect  estimate  of the contractor's  "real"  cost. 
When  outcome  is unobservable,  it is important  to specify  who owns  it.4 The outcome 
may be owned by the principal  (indicator  variable  Ip = 1) or by the agent (IP = 0). The 
former will be the case if the principal  is an investor, a landowner,  a consumer  or a 
"breather"  and the agent correspondingly  a manager,  a sharecropper,  a producer  or a GJESDAL AGENCY INFORMATION  375 
polluter. Examples  of the latter are the insurer-homeowner  and the lender-borrower 
relationships.  IP is assumed  to be determined  by exogenous  factors,  and  is not a variable 
of choice in the problem. 
The probabilities  of outcomes  and  signals  are denoted  f()  with  arguments  indicating 
which random  variables  are intended. Hence f(Xk)  is the marginal  probability  of the 
outcome Xk.  f(xk  I  Yi) is the conditional  probability  of Xk  given the signal yi etc.  The 
expectations  operator  is denoted E. The probability  of any outcome-signal  combination 
(x, y, z) is a function  of a -f(x,  y, z, a).  In Section 3 below particular  attention  will be 
paid to information  systems  and outcome  functions  satisfying  the assumption: 
Assumption  1.  For any values (x, y, z), f(x, y, z, a) is twice differentiable  in a. The 
matrix  of derivatives  of second-order  with respect  to a is diagonal. 
When a is one-dimensional  (p = 1), the latter  part  of Assumption  1 is trivially  true. 
When p>  1, the assumption  implies that the marginal  effects on f  of the different 
components  of a, are independent.  When attempting  to extend the theory from p = 1 
to p > 1, this seems to be a natural  starting  point.5 
In Section 5 below it is convenient,  mainly  for expositional  reasons, to work from 
a different  assumption  about the action  space: 
Assumption 2.  d  is finite. 
Finally, a sharing  rule-S:  {y}  ->  R-is  a contract  specifying  the transfer  of s units 
of money from the principal  to the agent, conditional  on the signal received from the 
information  system  being  used. Contracts  may  only be made  conditional  on signals  which 
are observed by principal  and agent. Preferences  are represented  by utility functions 
U(IPx -  s) for the principal and V((1 -  Ip)x + s, a) for the agent to whom decision making 
is delegated. 
Preferences  are assumed  to satisfy: 
Assumption 3.  U  is  trice differentiable,  increasing and concave.  V  is  trice 
differentiable  in either argument,  increasing and concave in the first argument and 
concave  in the second argument. 
Derivatives  with respect to the first argument  of utility functions  are indicated  by 
(').  Derivatives with respect to a are indicated by subscripts. In Sections 3 and 4 a 
further  assumption  is made which  is subsequently  relaxed  in Section 5: 
Assumption 4.  V(*,  )=  V1((l-Ip)x+s)+  V2(a). 
The agency  information  problem  may now be defined  as follows: 
Definition  1.  An  agency  information  problem,  denoted  [X, U, V, X, Ip],  is  to 
choose a pair  of functions  (Y, S) and an action a to max  EU(IPX - S) subject  to, 
Ye  E  (1) 
S:  {y}eg  -).  (2) 
ae  (3) 
EV((1 - IP)X + S, a ) _- V/  (4) 
a Eargmax  EV((1  - IP)X  + S, a).  (5) 
The agency  information  problem  is a game  with  a cooperative  and  a non-cooperative 
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chosen  to be  Pareto-efficient  subject to the agent choosing  his own best action in the 
second stage.  Every efficient (Y, S) combination may be generated by properly choosing 
the agent's level of utility V. 
The  agency  information  problem  is a generalization  of  previous  agency  models. 
These  may be  classified according to  assumptions made  about the  set  of  information 
systems W. A discussion is given in the following section. 
3.  VALUE  OF  INFORMATION 
For  an  agency  problem  [X, U, V,  , IP]  a ranking of  information  systems  Y  may  be 
characterized by 
W(Y)  = maxs EU(IPX  -  S)  subject to (2), (3), (4), (5). 
This ranking may be  used  to  define  the  concept  of marginal value  of  an information 
system given some information system  Y: 
Definition  2.  Z  is said to  have  marginal value  given  Y  in the  agency problem 
[X, U, V, -,  PI]  if W((Y,  Z)) >  W(  Y). 
The  concept  of value is that of economic  demand value.  Z  has marginal value if 
the agency is willing to pay something for the opportunity to base the incentive contract 
on Z  and Y rather than Y alone.  If Z  has marginal value given  Y?0no  information 
it is simply said to have value in the agency problem. 
In  this  section  we  shall  characterize  the  set  of  information  systems  which  have 
marginal value given an information system  Y for a fixed agency problem.  A  notable 
feature  of  this set  is that it depends  only slightly on  the  characteristics of  the  agency 
problem (X, U, V) when Ip  = 1. 
Several results in agency theory may be interpreted as value of information proposi- 
tions.  Theorem  11 in Wilson (1968) says that when principal and agent are risk averse, 
have  identically sloped,  linear risk-tolerance  functions,  and the agent has preferences 
for outcome  only  (V  is constant in its second  argument), then the sharing rule would 
be a non-constant  function of x  if X E Y.  In other words the information system X  is 
valuable in agency problems with the stated characteristics.  In this case the agent and 
the principal will have identical preferences over actions under optimal risk sharing, and 
the information system A  does  not have marginal value given X  i.e.  there is no need 
to observe the action as well.6 
Stiglitz ((1974),  Proposition 11) demonstrates that some sharing rule which is linear 
in x, will dominate constant sharing rules when the action (effort) has negative marginal 
utility to the  agent.  Hence  X  is valuable in this case as well.  Gjesdal  (1976),  Harris 
and Raviv (1976,  1979), Holmstrom (1977, 1979) and Shavell (1979) address the problem 
of  marginal value  given  X  in  this  model.  Of  particular interest  are  the  results  of 
Holmstrom  and  Shavell  who  characterize  the  set  of  information  systems  which  are 
marginally valuable given X  when X  is one-dimensional  (p = 1).  The objective  of this 
section  is to generalize  these  results to  an arbitrary given information system  Y  (and 
also p > 1).  One other work which did not assume that the outcome  X  is observable, 
is that of  Mirrlees (1976)  who  discusses  the  optimal  sharing rule when  W consists of 
information systems which are distributed as X + e, where e is white noise.7 
An agency problem and some information system  Y are then given.  The problem 
is to derive the conditions which an information system Z  must satisfy to have marginal 
value.  There are two reasons why this may be the case: Z  may improve risk sharing 
and/or incentives.  Two conditions will be formulated each of which is "almost" sufficient 
to  ensure that Z  has marginal value.  These  are the  conditions  of marginal insurance 
value and marginal incentive informativeness. GJESDAL  AGENCY  INFORMATION  377 
The following  notation will be used.  The optimal transfers based on  Y alone  are 
denoted  si (Vi: si = S(yi)).  The  action induced by this sharing rule is denoted  a*.  The 
transfers based on (Y, Z)  are denoted si + si1(Vi,  j: si + sij  = S(yi, zj)). To define marginal 
insurance value the incentive constraint (5) is ignored. 
Definition  3.  Z  has  marginal insurance  value  given  Y  in  the  agency  problem 
[X, U, V, .,  IP] if for some i, it is not true that Vj, sii = 0 solves the risk-sharing problem: 
max1s,11  Z  k,j U(I  Xk  -  Si  -Si)f(Xk,  yi, zi, a*)  (6) 
subject to 
Ekj  V((1 -I  )Xk  +si  +sij,  a*))f(xk,  yi, zj, a*)  =  Zk  V((1 -I  )xk +si)f(xk,  yi, a*). 
The  agency  is faced  with  m  risk sharing problems-one  for  each  i.  Z  has marginal 
insurance value if risk is better shared using a contract based on Z  and  Y, in at least 
one of these problems.  For each risk sharing problem the Lagrangian may be formed, 
with Lagrange multipliers Ai. If sij  0 solves each of these problems, it must satisfy the 
corresponding first-order conditions.  Hence 
Vi, Vj  Zk{U'(Ipxk-si)-AiV'((1-I  )Xk  +si,  a*)}f(Xk,  y1,  zi, a*) = O.  (7) 
Or, since either U'(  ) or V'(  ) is independent of Xk, (7) implies that for any A, 3 constants 
G(y1, A, a*),.  . .,  G(ym, A, a*), such that, Vi, j 
Zk  {Ut(Ipxk  -  Si) -A V'((1 -IP)xk  + si, a*)}f(xk  I  yi, zi, a*)  G(yi, zj,  A, a*)  (8) 
CG(yi,  A, a*). 
Optimal risk sharing requires that expected  marginal utility should be the same for all 
signals z;.  In general the owner's expected  marginal utility will be  a function  of  z  as 
well as y.  When (8) holds, it may, however, be said to be conditionally independent  of 
z  given  y.  Note  that the relationship between  marginal insurance value and marginal 
value in the agency problem is non-trivial, as insurance value is defined without regard 
to the incentive effects of the sharing rule. 
Next the terms incentive problem and marginal incentive informativeness are defined. 
Definition 4.  An incentive problem is said to exist given  Y for ah  at a * if 
aEU(IPX-S(y))  I  o.  (9) 
Aaa  a=a* 
The agent's marginal disutility of a change in a, given the sharing rule S(y),  is 0 by 
virtue of (5) assuming a* is in the interior of i.  If then the principal will derive positive 
utility from a change in a  (in some  direction), then a*  is not first-best Pareto efficient 
given the sharing rule S.8 
When an incentive problem exists given  Y, a modified contract based on the signals 
from Z  as well, may improve the agent's choice in a Pareto sense provided the following 
condition is satisfied, 
Definition 5.  An information system Z  is said to be marginally incentive informa- 
tive given Y for ah  at a* if A constants  Hh(yI, a*),.  . . , Hh(ym,  a*) such that, 
aVf(y,  z1,  a)/3ah  |  Hh (yi, zi, a*)  Hh (Yi,  a*)  (10) 
f(y1,  z1,  a*  a=a* 
Holmstrom (1979)  defines marginal incentive informativeness for the case  Y = X.  Fol- 
lowing his arguments it is easy to show that if Z  is not marginally incentive informative 378  REVIEW  OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
given  Y for any ah  at any value of a, then 
f(y, z, a) =f(y,  z)f(y,  a).  (11) 
Analogous  to the relationship among random variables (11) may be said to express the 
conditional independence  of a  and Z  given  Y  Note,  however,  that a  is not a random 
variable. 
The central result on marginal value of information will now be proven, and then 
interpreted in the light of the concepts just defined. 
Proposition  1.  Let  Assumptions  1,  3  and  4  hold  and  an  agency  problem 
[X, U, V, {Y}, 1] be given.  Let si = S(yi)  and a*  solve the problem. Assume  that a*  is 
unique and in the interior  of 4d.  Then Z has marginal value given Y unless 
-G(yi,  z1,  a*  A) + Zh  hV  (se,  a *)Hh(yi, z1,  a*) = 0  for a.e.  yi, Zj,  (12) 
where 
ZkZi  U(Xk  Si)fah(Xk,  yi, a*) 
-{ZE V(si,  a*)fahah  +  Vahahl 
A  proof of Proposition  1 is given in the Appendix  along with a discussion of the 
important assumptions imposed on a * and Ip.  An informal discussion of the Proposition 
follows.  Clearly (12) will not hold if there exists a signal yi for which the left-hand side 
of  (12)  takes  on  more  than one  value  i.e.  depends  non-trivially  on  z.  Applying  the 
definitions:  3 i: G(yi,  ) depends  on  z  if Z  has marginal insurance value.  3 i: Hh (yi,  ) 
depends on z  if z  is marginally incentive informative for ah, and ,Uh  0  Oif an incentive 
problem exists for ah. 
To understand (12), it is best viewed as a generalization of the results of Holmstrom 
((1979),  Proposition  3-sufficiency)  and  Shavell  ((1979),  Proposition  5)  for  the  case 
Y = X, p = 1 and ,u > 0.  Clearly, when Y = X, G does not depend on z, and H  depending 
on z  for some value of x, is a sufficient condition for Z  to have marginal value.  This is 
the Holmstr6m-Shavell  result. 
Now assume  Y = X, but p > 1. Then 
3h, i:Hh(yi,  )  depends on z, and gh  $0,  (13) 
is not quite sufficient for Z  to be marginally valuable.  Let this value of h be denoted 
h1. There may exist h2 for which Hh2( ) depends on z and 1h2 $ 0, such that ,Uh,Hh1  (Yi,  ) + 
/.h2Hh2(Yi,  ')  does not depend on z for any yi. 
However,  ,u is a characteristic of the agency problem, and H(')  is a characteristic 
of Z.  It follows that this alignment will only happen by accident when (13) holds.  Hence 
(13) may be regarded as almost sufficient for Z  to have marginal value. 
The discussion in the preceding paragraphs generalizes readily to the case where  Y 
is some arbitrary information system except that G(yi, .) may now depend on z  as well. 
In that case  Z  may be  valuable  for  improving insurance even  when  it is useless  for 
incentive purposes.  If (11) holds, and Vh, i: Hh  (yi, ' ) is a constant, 
3i: G(yi,  )  depends on z  (14) 
is sufficient for Z  to be marginally valuable.  When (13) and (14) hold, it is possible that 
the incentive and insurance effects cancel out.  However,  again this must be regarded as 
an accidental case as (14) depends  on  the joint  distribution of X,  Y, Z,  whereas  (13) 
depends on its derivative with respect to a.  Hence  (14) is almost sufficient for marginal 
value as well.9 
Summing up this discussion,  it may be  concluded  that the  sufficiency part of  the 
Holmstrom-Shavell  results essentially generalizes to arbitrary given information systems GJESDAL AGENCY INFORMATION  379 
Y and  multidimensional  actions. It has been shown  that  there exists  a marginal  incentive 
informativeness  condition  which  is essentially  sufficient  for marginal  value given Y, and 
which  is easily seen to be a generalization  of the Holmstrom-Shavell  incentive  informa- 
tiveness  condition. However,  when X is replaced  by Y, marginal  incentive  informative- 
ness is no longer a necessary  condition  for marginal  value as an additional  information 
system Z may be valuable  as information  about the outcome x as well as the action a. 
To understand  this note that the agent's and the principal's  ability  to share risk depend 
on the precision with which they can measure the owner's marginal  utility ex post. 
However, the transfer  payment  is a function  only of the (conditional)  expected  marginal 
utility  (given  the signal). This is evident  from (7) or (8). (8) then states that  the expected 
marginal  utility  of the owner  is conditionally  independent  of Z given Y. Thus  Z provides 
additional  information  relevant  to risk  sharing  if and only if (8) is false. 
The risk sharing/incentives  dichotomy  which has been constructed,  should not be 
overstressed  as the two sources  of demand  are closely interrelated.  Information  systems 
which satisfy (8) but not (10) may still be used to improve risk sharing. Y = X  and 
Z = A is an obvious  example. When  X alone is observable,  it must  be used for incentives 
as well as insurance. If a  is observed as well, a contract based on a  takes care of 
incentives  and risk is then shared (efficiently)  by means of an outcome based contract. 
Similarly,  information  systems which satisfy (10), but not (8) may offer opportunities 
for incentive  improvement. 
4.  COMPARISONS OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
In Section 3 an information  system Y was assumed  to have been acquired,  and the set 
of information  systems  Z which had marginal  value given Y, was characterized.  In this 
section  the problem  is to choose either  Z or Y l0 For a fixed  agency  problem  the ranking 
W(*) tells which one should be chosen. However, in this section a preference  relation 
is sought  which  is largely  independent  of the particular  agency  problem. If Z is preferred 
to Y, Z is at least as valuable  as Y for every agency problem  whose outcome function 
is measurable  with respect to  the field generated by a prespecified finite partition 
$ =ei,  ... ., eq} of the state space (regardless  of a).  In addition the agency problem 
should satisfy Assumptions  2 (d  is finite) and 4 (the agent's utility function  is linearly 
separable). Assumption  4 plays  an important  role although  it may be relaxed  somewhat. 
Assumption  2 is invoked  mainly  to avoid unnecessary  mathematical  complications.' 
Three likelihood  matrices  are defined (r is the cardinality  of the set i): 
A(W,  a)={Aij =f(yj  ei, a)}  qxm 
A(.d)-Aij  ={f(yj  aj)}  rXm 
A  (F, d)  = JA  ii = f(yj |(e, a) j)j  r *  q x m 
The likelihood  matrices  of another  information  system  Z are similarly  defined,  and 
are distinguished  by 
We note that although  there is no probability  space defined on X, the likelihood 
matrices A(d), A($, d)  are well-defined. However, the absence of a measure on . 
means that A($',  a) depends  on a. With this exception, $ and sd are symmetrical  in the 
definitions. From Blackwell's  theorem (Blackwell  (1951)) we know that if we want to 
compare  information  systems for decision problems  with $-measurable  outcome func- 
tions, the only problem  independent  ranking  is characterized  by the following  condition, 
Condition  B.  A'($, a) = A($, a)M($, a), where M($, a) is a m x m' dimensional 
Markov matrix.12 Blackwell's  theorem says that Y is preferred  to Z  for all decision 
problems  if and only if Condition  B holds. If Condition  B is true, Z is distributed  as if 
it is a garbled version of  Y, with M(v) as the noise-generating  mechanism. Analogy 380  REVIEW  OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
suggests generalizing Blackwell's condition as if the state space were 0 x iW.  This conjec- 
ture actually works to give, 
Proposition  2.  Let Assumption  2 and  4 hold. An  information system Y is weakly 
preferred  to another information system Z for all agency problems with outcome functions 
X(e,  a)  if  there exists  a  m x m'  dimensional  Markov-matrix M(W, sd)  which satisfies 
Condition BA  '(',  sd) =  A(',  sd)M(',  si). 
The converse is not true. 
Proof.  Assume Ip = 1.  The alternative case is done similarly. 
Assume  that  Y, Z  satisfy  Condition  BA.  Let  S'(z)  be  an arbitrary sharing rule 
based on Z.  The proposition will be proved by showing that there exists a sharing rule 
S(y)  based on  Y, with the property that the principal prefers S to S' whereas the agent 
is indifferent. 
S  will be constructed in such a way that the agent is induced to choose  the same 
act under S as he would under S'. 
If the element in the i-th row and j-th column of M(W,  sd) is denoted mij,  S is defined 
implicitly by, 
Vi(S(yi))  = Ei V1(S'(z1))mmi.  (15) 
When S is defined this way the agent's objective functions EV(S'(z),  a) and EV(S(y),  a) 
are identical functions of a, and must therefore induce the same choice: 
EV(S'(z),  a)  ZkEJ{Vl(S'(zi))+  V2(a)}f(zjlek,  a)f(ek, a) 
=  k  EZi  EZ{  Vl  (S'(Z1))  + V2(a)}mijf(yi I  ek, a)f(ek, a) 
=Ek  Ei {  Vl(S(yi)) + V2(a)}f(yi I  ek, a)f(ek, a) 
=EV(S(y),  a). 
The second equality is Condition BA. The third follows by the definition of S. 
The identity of objective functions also implies that the agent is indifferent between 
S and S'.  It remains to be proved that the principal prefers S to S'.  Since both sharing 
rules induce the same choice, the action variable may be suppressed, 
EU(X-  S (z)) =Ek  Ei Ei  U(Xk  -  S(zj))mE;  J(Yi,  ek) 
- Ek E i U (Xk-  E j S  (Zij)  mEij)f(yi,  ek ) 
-Ek  Ei  LJ(Xk  -S(yi))f(yi,  ek) 
= EU(X-S(y)) 
where the first inequality follows by Jensen's inequality.  The second is derived from the 
definition of S: 
The concavity of  V1 implies that 
S(yi) < Ej S'(zj)mij  for every i. 
To prove that the converse is not true, a counterexample is constructed for the case 
where  there  are two  events  {e,, e2} and two  actions {a1, a2}: Information systems  are 
defined by means of partitions on the product space 0 x iW: 
Y: = {{(el,  al)(e2,  a2)}, {(el,  a2)}, {(e2, al)}} 
Z:  = {{(el,  a1)}, {(el,  a2)}, {(e2, a)},  {(e2, a2)}}. GJESDAL  AGENCY  INFORMATION  381 
Z  is perfect information. Y is strictly coarser than perfect information,  and hence 
Condition  BA does not hold. However, Y is always  as valuable  as Z. To see this assume 
neither  el nor e2  are null-sets  (if they are, the claim  is obvious). Then a1 may  be enforced 
by a contract based on  Y which penalizes the agent sufficiently  if {(e1,  a2)} obtains. 
Similarly  a2 may be enforced by a penalty if {(e2,  al)} obtains. This enforcement  is 
costless  since if the agent complies,  no penalty  will be imposed. Given this enforcement, 
Y is equivalent  to perfect information  since it is perfect information  on events for a 
given a.  It follows that Y is as valuable  as Z for any agency  information  problem  with 
$-measurable  outcome function.  || 
In the agency  problem  information  is used for insurance  and incentive  purposes. It 
is instructive  to see how the information  system Y solves each problem at least as 
well as Z.  If mij is interpreted  as the conditional  probability  f(zj I  yi), then S(yi) may be 
interpreted  as the certainty  equivalent  of the gamble  which pays S'(zj) with probability 
f(z1 I  yi). Hence S may be viewed as employing  a deductible  E(S'|  y) -  S(y) for every y, 
rather  than randomizing  through  this gamble.13  The same incentive effect is obtained, 
and less risk is imposed  on the agent. 
The fact that Z  in the counterexample  of Proposition  2 is perfect information,  is 
not essential to the argument. In fact {a1, a2} may alternatively  be interpreted  as some 
two-set partition  of the action space  .14  Adopting this interpretation,  the two subsets 
may be denoted di and d2.  With Z  the agency is then limited to enforcing  the agent's 
most preferred  choice in either a- or a2. With Y the agency can do as well. The idea 
is that for incentive purposes an information  system which may detect some shirking 
(whether  the agent chooses an action  in d1 rather  than  &2 or vice versa)  may be replaced 
by any information  system which detects this shirking  with positive probability.15  This 
argument  shows how the game nature  of the agency  problem  influences  the comparison 
of information  systems. It is not valid to treat the action a as if it were a state variable 
in some Bayesian  decision  problem. 
In this first part of the sufficiency  proof the full strength  of Condition  BA is not 
needed. Use is only made of the weaker Condition  A which  may be identified  with yet 
another  Markov  matrix,  M(s). 
Condition A.  A'(s?')  = A(d)M(d). 
In fact one might as well have summed over k to eliminate the event variable 
altogether  in this part of the proof. Similarly,  if Condition  A is true, the agent may be 
induced  to make the same choice with Y as with Z without  being worse off, in the case 
where he owns X but is risk neutral. In the latter case as well as in the case where the 
principal  owns X and is risk  neutral,  the functional  inequality  E(S' l  y) _ S(y) is sufficient 
to make the principal  prefer S  to S' given that both induce the same act.  Finally, 
Condition A  is also sufficient  when we only consider outcome functions which are 
measurable  with respect  to (0,  0) for every a, i.e. non-stochastic  outcome  functions. In 
that case Conditions  A and BA are equivalent. Thus; 
Corollary 1.  Assume  Condition A  holds, and either 
(i)  the owner is risk neutral, or 
(ii) X(O, a)  is measurable with respect to (0,  0) 
then Y is weakly preferred  to Z. 
Since (i) and (ii) are cases where there is no risk-sharing  demand  for information, 
the corollary justifies defining Condition A  as the incentive ranking of information 
systems.16 This result  seems to correspond  to the idea of responsibility  accounting:  "For 
example,  the (performance)  report  for a shop foreman's  department  would contain  only 
his controllable  costs. (Horngren  [1977], p. 161)." 382  REVIEW  OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
In the second part of the proof of sufficiency, Condition B is used.  To prove that 
the principal prefers S, it must be demonstrated that S' does  not insure the principal's 
risk represented by X, better than S. Again arguing as if M is the conditional distribution 
of Z  given  Y, it is clear that S' cannot be better for risk sharing since the randomization 
represented by Z  is independent of e, and hence of X. 
It follows  then,  as  another  corollary  of  the  proposition,  that insurance schemes 
should not be randomized-hardly  a surprising result.  The idea of randomized incentive 
schemes may seem as far-fetched to some.  However, it is a fact that the set of admissible 
utility functions must be restricted in the Proposition.  Additive  utility functions make 
S independent of a in (15).17  Under more general assumptions randomization may well 
be Pareto-optimal.  This problem is explored in the following section. 
The need to impose restrictions on utility functions is another proof that the agency 
information  problem  is  not,  formally,  a  Bayesian  decision  problem.  It  follows  that 
Proposition 2 is not a trivial generalization of Blackwell's theorem.  The agency problem 
contains restrictions which are not of the form encountered  in decision problems.  The 
possibility of randomized schemes, moreover, proves that there is no way to reinterpret 
or reformulate the problem, to make it formally equivalent to a decision problem. 
5.  RANDOM  INCENTIVE  SCHEMES 
Proposition  2 does  not hold for arbitrary utility functions  V(  ).  In this section  it will 
be demonstrated that there are utility functions for which Y may be strictly more valuable 
than Z  even though Z  is ranked higher by the Condition BA  ordering.  In other words 
randomization may be efficient.18 For such a demonstration, the simplest case will suffice. 
Z  is therefore initially assumed to be the null system  Y?, and Y' some random mechan- 
ism.19 First an example is offered and discussed.  The section is concluded with a look 
at the general case. 
Example.  The agent's utility function is, 
2 
V(s,a)=s(4-a)  a 
a 
defined on the set 
I{O<a< 4,  O_s  '(4-a). 
Note that the agent is risk averse on this domain. 
For a given s, the agent's optimal action is found by solving, 
2 
-s  + ?  = 0aa  = Vs(s  <(  )  (16) 
a29 
as the second order condition for a maximum is satisfied. 
The principal is risk neutral and the outcome  function is x = a.  No  information is 
available.  Hence  the principal maximizes, 
U = a -s  = 'Is-s 
and the solution is s = 4,  a = 2,  U  =  4,  V  =  4. 
3  is assumed  to be an acceptable  level of 
utility for the agent. 
We shall now demonstrate  that a random sharing rule will make both individuals 
better off: 
S {  with probability 2 
S2  with probability 2- GJESDAL AGENCY INFORMATION  383 
With  this sharing  rule the agent's  first-order  condition  becomes 
2  2 
Si  S 
2EV'a  =  -S1  +  2  -  S2  +  2  0  (17)  a  a 
which  gives 
2  2 
2  S_  +S2  a= 
S1+S2 
If s, is arbitrarily  fixed at 0, a =  S2 and 
1  EU  =,~s  - 
2-2  2 
2 
1  S222= 
1[  v-  ~S2] 
at the principal's  optimum  S2=  1. Hence both are better off with randomization. 
The key to understanding  the example is to observe that the agent's first-order 
condition  (16) is convex in s. This implies that making  the salary  random  will increase 
the agent's  output. To interpret  convexity  the second-derivative  of (16) with respect to 
s(V" ) may be expressed  by means of the agent's  absolute  risk aversion  (RA): 
if=VdRAR  V"a  '  da  -AVad  (18) 
The benefit to the principal  of giving away an extra non-random  $ has the same sign as 
V'.  Hence V' > 0 at the optimal  non-random  s. It follows that (16) is convex (V" > 0) 
only if dRA/da <0.  Hence randomizing  the agent's salary makes him work harder 
because  hard work  increases his  risk  tolerance.  The  second  incentive effect- 
RA V' -may  be called the "utility  effect". Risk lowers the agent's  level of utility  which 
influences  his action preferences. The "utility  effect"  on a is negative  as, V' > 0, and it 
is (not surprisingly)  proportional  to the agent's  absolute  risk aversion. 
What  is more surprising,  is that in the setting  of the example-risk neutral  principal, 
non-binding  efficiency  constraint (4) and no information-a  positive incentive effect 
(V" > 0) is also a sufficient  condition  for randomization  to be efficient.20  The explanation 
is as follows. Consider  increasing  the agent's salary by a small amount. The agent is 
certainly  better off. At the optimum  the principal  is indifferent  as the cost equals the 
benefit. Now make the extra salary random, but such that its mean is equal to the 
non-random  raise  being  considered.21  The randomization  does increase  the risk  imposed 
on the agency. However, at the margin the agent is strictly  better off as long as the 
expected salary increase is positive. The principal  is risk neutral, and the cost of the 
random  increase  is therefore  identical  to that  of a non-random  one. However,  the benefit 
of a random  raise is larger,  since its incentive effect is greater. Hence the principal  is 
strictly  better off as well. 
The discussion  in the preceding  paragraph  does not generalize. That (4) is non- 
binding  and the principal  is risk neutral,  is crucial  to the argument. In the general  case 
the efficiency  of randomization  hinges on a trade-off  between an incentive  effect which 
may be positive, and a risk effect which is always  non-positive,  and is a function  of the 
agency's risk-aversion. The latter concept, which is derived from the risk-aversion  of 
the participants,  is defined  below and denoted R.  The main result  on randomization  as 
an incentive  mechanism  may then be summed  up as follows. 
Proposition 3.  Assume I p = p =  1, ,t >O, and that the agent's choice with the optimal 
deterministic sharing rule-a  *-is  unique and  in  the interior of  si.  Then the transfer 384  REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 
payment  should  be randomized  when  signal yi obtains,  if 
1  aRA(yi)  1 E{U'(*)Iyi}  (1 
R (yi)  da  ,u  V'(S(yi)) 
Proof.  The information  system Y  is given.  The optimal non-random transfer 
payment  is S*(yi) = s* when the signal is yi, and this sharing  rule induces the agent to 
choose a*.  It is also assumed  that the principal  owns X, and at the optimum  wants the 
agent to choose a larger  a (which  is a scalar). 
Assumptions 1 and 3 imply that the agent's objective function is differentiable. 
Hence any interior  maximum  must  satisfy 
aEV(S, a) = 0  (20) 
aa 
For j$ i, let s; be fixed at s',  and assume  that a* is a unique interior  maximum. Then 
(20) defines a differentiable  function a(si) at least in a neighbourhood  of s*.  Since si 
maximizes 
L = EU(X  -  S) + AEV(S, a (si)), 
it satisfies  the first-  and second-order  conditions  (using  (20)): 
dL  aEU  aEV  aEU da 
=  ~+  A  ~+  -  =0  (21) 
dsi  asi  asi  aa  dsi 
d2L  a2EU  a2EV  a2EU da  a2EV da  a2EU daY2 
=  2+A  ~2+  -  2  di-  2=  as,  as,  asiaa  dsi  asiaa  dsi,  a2  a  dsa  I 
a2EU da  aEU d  2a  a2EV/ d\  2  a2EV da 
+  .  +  -+  2+A  2  +A  <0.  (22)  aaasi ds  i  aa  dsd  aa  asi dsi 
The derivatives  of a (si) are found by differentiating  implicitly  with respect  to si in (21): 
da  a2EV/aaasi  Vaf+ Vfa 
dsi -  -a2EV/aa2  -  a2EV/a2  (23) 
d  2a  d[a2 EV/aaasi]/dsi  + d[a2EV/aa2]/dsida/dsi  (24) 
ds5  -a2EV/aa2 
Using, 
,u = aEU/da/-a2EV/aa  2 > 0  (25) 
and substituting  (23) into (21), the following  expression  is derived  for later use, 
f(i)(A  )  -  V'(s  a*)(  aS  +V(s,  a*)f(yi))  (26) 
Now consider spinning a roulette wheel or using some other random mechanism  to 
determine  the agent's  pay when Y = yi. The random  payment,  which  is independent  of 
X and  a, is denoted T. Using  I(yi) for the indicator  random  variable  of the set {O:  Y = Yi}, 
the following  incentive  scheme is proposed: 
S* + hTI(yi) 
where h is a scalar. The problem  is to maximise 
L(h, T) = EU(X  -  S* -  hTI(yi)) + AEV(S* + hTI(yi), a) 
with respect  to h and T subject  to the incentive  constraint. 
First T is considered  fixed, and the conditions  under which this randomization  is 
(locally) useful will be derived. Those are the conditions  under which h = 0 is not a 
local maximum  of L(h, T). Then the choice of T is considered. GJESDAI  AGENCY INFORMATION  385 
Differentiating  L(  ) with  respect  to h at h = 0 is considerably  simplified  by noting  that 
aEU/ah  =  aEU/asiET 
and 
a2EU/ah  2 = a2EU/das2iET2  etc. 
at h =0. 
dL  aEU  AEV  aEU da 
=ii  as,ET +A  a  ET  +  aa  (27)  dh  =s  E  +si  aa  dh 
d2L  a2EU  a  2EVT  i-2EU  a2EV  da 
2=  2ET  2+A  T 
2 
+  +A  -ET  dh  asds  asiaa  asi  aa  dh 
a2EU  da\2  a2EU da  aEU  d 2a 
+  2  +  -ET+ 
a  2  dh  aasi  dh  aa  dh2 
a2EVIda\2  a2EVda  I  L  -  ~  -FT.  (28) 
aa2  dhl  aaasi dh 
Differentiating  twice in the agent's  first  order  condition, 
a2EV 
da  aaasi  ET  =da  ET  (29) 
a2EV  ds 
aa2 
2  2  2  __T_2+2  _a  (ET)2-+  a3EVda\2  ]2  dh2  -da2EV/aa  La  as,  aa2as,  dsi  aa  ds 
(ET)2 da+  EV/a  s2 (ET2  _ (ET)2).  (30) 
d,-a2EV/aa  2 
Substituting  (29) and (30) into (27) and (28), 
dL= ET-L= O  (31) 
dh  dsi 
d2L  d  2L  a2EaU  aF2V  a3EV1  ds2(ET)2  +  22  (FT2  A(FT)2)  (32) 






aaas2 =  V"(s*, a*)fa + Va'(s*,  a*)f, 
using (26) yields, 
d2L  d2L  (ET)2+[  d  V"(s~, a*)f(A  +,ut-  +11V(s*,  a*)f  (ET2-(ET)2)  dh  2  dS  Las,fJ 
=  2LF 
a2EU 
VI' ,aFU  d 2  (ET)2  +  [  -  -  +  V'f)  + ,u  V"f  (ET2-  (ET)2)  ds 
i  a  s 1  VI  ~asj 
d  d2L(F  a2FU  V  4(aEU  v:1+  ) 
ds,  aT)2s+  V  ait  (ET  2-(ET)2) 
d  2L (E)  U  a 2FU  iFU  V'  ' dRA 
=  2(ET)2+i  12  -1  ,iV'  var  T  (33) 
ds  i  asi  \as~  asi  '  daJ 386  REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 
Since dL/dh =0, L has a local maximum  at h =0  unless d2L/dh2> 0. The first  term in 
(33) is non-positive  because of (22). It follows that a2L/ah2> 0 only if the term inside 
the square  bracket,  where the term inside the parenthesis  is defined  to be the agency's 
(absolute)  risk  aversion  (R), is positive. This is (19). 
On the other hand if the term in the square  bracket  is positive, and taking T to be 
a choice variable,  d2L/dh2 can be made positive by choosing  a T which  has sufficiently 
large  variance  in relation  to its mean. This proves Proposition  3.  11 
Several  remarks  on the analysis  are  in order. First,  note that  the results  are consistent 
with the discussion  of the example. There U"  = A =0,  and from (32) it follows that 
randomization  is efficient  whenever  the agent's  first-order  condition  is convex. 
Secondly, attention is called to a difference  between this analysis  and the analysis 
in Section  3. There  it was  demonstrated  that  an information  system  is marginally  valuable 
whenever it provides information  about a not already available. The increased risk 
imposed on the agency by the revised contract  does not matter (at the margin). The 
reason for this is that the incentive effect of more information  is a first-order  effect 
(influences  the first derivative  of the objective function) whereas the risk effect is of 
second order (influences  only the second derivative). However, the incentive  effect of 
randomization  is a second order  effect as well. It follows that randomization  is valuable 
only if the incentive  effect is "large  enough"  relative  to the negative  effect of more risk. 
Thirdly,  it should be clear from (33) that (19) is necessary  as well as sufficient  for 
a marginal  randomization  to effect a Pareto  improvement. 
Finally, Proposition  3, like Proposition 1, depends on the assumption  that a* is 
unique. If the agent is indifferent  between several actions, a marginal  randomization 
may  make  him  jump  to an action  where  risk  is less harmful.  This may  make  the principal 
worse off as long as the agent, when indifferent,  chooses the principal's  preferred  action. 
To rule out jumps when a*  is not unique, it is sufficient  to assume that aEV/aa  is 
uniformly  convex i.e. that a3EV/aaas2 > 0 for all a. 
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we have tried to develop a theory of incentive-insurance  demand for 
information. 
We have shown that information  may be used to control decentralized  decision- 
making if the probabilities  of the signals received from the information  system are 
influenced  by the choices  made  by decision  makers. Even though  they in general  increase 
social risk, incentive schemes based on information  systems which are informative  in 
this sense, will give Pareto-improvement  when the choices, that would have been made 
with no such scheme, are inefficient  (except for some special cases). Our results are 
easily seen to be generalizations  of those of Holmstrom  (1979) and Shavell  (1979). 
As in Holmstrom  and Shavell,  it has been assumed  that the agent's optimal  action 
is unique. The justification  for this assumption  as well as the consequences  of relaxing 
it, are important  topics for further  research. 
We have also characterized  an informativeness  ranking  which may be viewed as a 
generalization  of Blackwell's  ranking  of information  systems. It is not, however,  a trivial 
extension of Blackwell's  theorem. The incentive problem is a non-cooperative  game, 
and the Bayesian  theory  of decision  making  use of information  does not apply. Indeed  it 
is shown that more information  according  to the Blackwell  ranking  is sufficient  but not 
necessary  for an information  system  to be uniformly  as valuable  as another  system. 
There  are even cases  in which  randomization  is efficient. In these cases less informa- 
tion (again in the Blackwell sense) is preferred  to more, and randomization  may be 
viewed as throwing  away information. Risk has a positive incentive  effect if the agent's 
risk  aversion  decreases  when a changes  in a direction  which  is preferred  by the principal. GJESDAL  AGENCY  INFORMATION  387 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1.  Z  has no marginal value if and only if the optimal sharing 
rule based on Z  and Y does not depend on z  i.e.  a*  and Vi, j: sii = 0 solves the agency 
problem. It will be demonstrated that unless (12) is true, sii  0 does not satisfy a first-order 
condition of the agency problem.  The problem of choosing the sharing rule S for the 
information system (Y, Z)  may be formulated as follows: Max with respect to sii, a 
Ek Ei Ej {U(xk  -  Si  -  si;)  + A  V(si + sij,  a)}f(Xk, yi, zj, a)  (A. 1) 
subject to (2), (3) and (5). 
The strategy of the proof is to derive the function a (s1i,..  .,  smm)  in the neighbour- 
hood of a  *,  and use this function to show that (A. 1) has no stationary point at a  *, sij  0 
unless (12) is satisfied. 
Because  of  differentiability Assumptions  1 and  3,  and since  a*  solves  (5) when 
sij  0, and is in the interior of i:  Vh; 
a  Ek Ei Ej  V(si  +  sij,  a)f  (Xk,  yi, zj, a)I a =a*,sija  o = 0  (A.2) 
aah 
Moreover, since a* is a unique global maximum, the implicit functions theorem implies 
the existence of a differentiable  function a (sii,..  ,  s  )  in some neighbourhood  of 
sij  0 (assuming the matrix of second-order  conditions  corresponding to  (A.2)  is non- 
singular). The derivatives are found by differentiating implicitly with respect to sij in (ii). 
Evaluated at a *, sij  0, the derivatives are, 
aak 
V'(si,  a)ah  ( yij Zj, a) +  E?k  {E  i Ei (V(si,  a)fahak  ( Yi, Zj, a) +  Vahak)}  a=0  (A.3) 
h=l,...,p,  i=l,...,m,  j=l,...,m'. 
Additivity  assumptions on fQ ) and  V(  )  (Assumptions  1 and 4)  allow  the  following 
simple solution to the simultaneous equation system (A.3); Vi, j, h 
aah  V'(si,  a)fah(yi,  zj, a)  (A.4) 
1sil  a=a*,si=O ?  i V(si,  a)fahah (yi,  a)  +  Vahah 
Finally, differentiating (A. 1) using (A.2), then (A.4) and assuming (yi, zi) is not a null-set, 
yields (with again all derivatives evaluated at a = a *,  s  0, and derivatives involving a 
interpreted as vectors): Vi, j; 
aEU  aEU  aa  aEV  aEV aa 
?  -+A  ?+A  - 
asij  aa  asij  asij  aa  as 
aEU  aEV  aEU  aa 
=-  ?A  ?+  - 
asij  asij  aa  asij 
=f(yi,  zj, a){  -[Zk{U'(Xk-si)-AV'(si,  a)}f(xk Iys,  Zj,  a)] 
+Eh  [Ek  Ei  U(Xk  Si)fah  (Xk,  yi,  a)]  [  Vt(s,  a) fah  (Yi,  Zi,  a)  (A.5) 
L  EiV(si,  a)fahah  ?  Vahahl}  f(Yi, z1,a)JJ  (A5 
Unless  (A.5) =0,  sij  0 is not a stationary point, and Z  has marginal value given  Y. 
The  Appendix  will be  concluded  with a discussion of  three  assumptions made  in 
Proposition  1: that a * is unique and interior in  i,  and that the principal owns X(IP  = 1). 
First,  the  role  played  by  the  assumption  that  the  principal  owns  X(IP  = 1)  in 
Proposition  1,  should  be  pointed  out.  Mainly,  this  assumption  has  been  made  for 
expositional  reasons.  The alternative case (IP = 0) could be developed  along the same 388  REVIEW  OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
lines.  However,  one  of  the  striking features  of  Proposition  1, the  fact that marginal 
incentive informativeness is essentially independent of the agency problem (X, U, V), is 
lost.  When Ip =0,  (10) is replaced by: 
Zk  V'(Xk +si,  a)fah(xk,  Yi,  zi, a)Ia=a*  =H=I(yi,  a*)f(yi, zj, a*).  (10t) 
The  assumptions  imposed  on  a  *,  on  the  other  hand,  are crucial at least  technically. 
Non-interior solutions may surface in some formulations of the agency problem, notably 
those which assume that V(  ) is monotone  decreasing in a  (effort).  If it is assumed that 
V(  ) increases  in  a  for sufficiently low  a's  (arguably a more  attractive assumption), 
non-interior solutions are less likely to be a problem.  The proof of Proposition  1 relies 
heavily on the fact that when  a*  is an interior solution,  there exist small variations in 
the sharing rule which have positive incentive effects while the marginal increase in risk 
has zero value.  When a* is not an interior point, quite large changes in the sharing rule 
may be required to induce changes in a, and even  if the incentive  effect is positive,  it 
may be outweighted by the non-marginal increase in risk. 
Finally, as Mirrlees (1975)  has shown, the methods which have been developed  to 
solve  for the optimal sharing rule in the agency problem, may not capture the optimal 
solution unless its induced action is unique (Grossman and Hart (1981)  has solved this 
problem for finite  i).  As it is impossible to check this requirement in advance, Mirrlees' 
point is quite serious.  When the objective is to characterize the set of marginally valuable 
information systems,  non-uniqueness  presents  a somewhat  different problem.  As  the 
information system  Y and the sharing rule S(y)  are given, it is at least possible to check 
whether these  induce a unique action.  However,  the characterization problem for the 
case of non-unique  a*  remains.  The difficulty is the following.  Assume  that the agent 
given S(y)  is indifferent between  a' and a", but chooses  a" which, although it is not a 
stationary point of the principal's evaluation measure, is preferred by him to a'.  Unless 
(10) is satisfied at a", it is possible to proceed  as above and construct a variation in the 
sharing rule based on Z, which makes some a"', preferred by the principal to a", a local 
maximum of the agent's evaluation measure instead of a". However,  it may be that the 
global  solution  to  the  agent's  problem  is somewhere  in the  neighbourhood  of  a'  for 
every such variation, thus making the principal worse off.  It is necessary to check whether 
a local improvement is a global improvement as well. 
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NOTES 
1.  Why the principal is affected by the agent's decision,  is outside  the scope of this paper.  In general 
terms the reason may be that the principal insures the agent's property, that the principal as owner of property 
is delegating  decision-making  to the agent because  of the agent's comparative advantage, or it may be that 
the principal (government) is entitled to some share of the agent's property and income. 
2.  Gjesdal (1976), Harris and Raviv (1976),  (1979),  Holmstr6m (1977),  (1979),  Mirrlees (1976),  Shavell 
(1979). 
3.  Ross (1973a,  b), Spence and Zeckhauser (1971),  Stiglitz (1974),  Wilson (1968),  (1969). 
4.  This is in contrast to the case of observable X  where choice of "ownership" is subsumed in the choice 
of sharing rule. 
5.  An interesting interpretation of a for which the diagonality assumption holds, is the following: Assume 
the agent is allowed to receive some private information (W: 0 -- {wi}) after contracting but before  he makes 
his decision.  Then a may be interpreted as the agent's decision function (or strategy) with ai the choice made GJESDAL  AGENCY  INFORMATION  389 
in response  to the signal  wi. It follows  that  ai influences  the random  variables  X, Y,  Z on the set {l: W(M)  = wi} 
only, and the matrix  of derivatives  of second-order  is diagonal  when it exists. In this model the objective  is 
to induce  the agent  to use his private  information  Pareto  efficiently.  Hence it is an adverse  selection  problem 
formulated  as a moral  hazard  problem. 
6. Ross (1973a, b) derives  these  results  as well. The reason  why  stronger  conclusions  cannot  be obtained, 
is that the agent's  action  is undetermined  when the sharing  rule is constant  (Y? is employed). However,  with 
a constant  sharing  rule, there is no risk-sharing  and whatever  action is chosen, Y? is inferior  to perfect 
information  i.e. the information  system  (X, A). 
7. Two other papers  should be mentioned  as well. Spence and Zeckhauser  (1971) assume a special 
outcome structure  and observation  of  0, a, and x  in various combinations. Townsend (1979) discusses 
risk-sharing  when  observation  of X is costly,  but no incentive  problem  exists. 
8. The converse  is not true: a* may be inefficient  given S, and (9) does not hold. This will be the case 
when  a* is a minimum  of the principal's  evaluation  measure  with  the second  derivative  sufficiently  large. If the 
definition  of the incentive  problem  is broadened  to include  these  cases,  Proposition  1 below  will  no longer  hold. 
Holmstrom  (1979) and Shavell  (1979) impose  restrictions  on outcome  functions  to avoid  this problem. 
9. Gjesdal  (1978) argues  that it is possible  to define a reasonable  measure  on the space of information 
systems,  with the property  that the set of information  systems  which satisfy  (12) as well as (13) and/or (14) 
has measure  zero. Note also that (12) is necessary  but not sufficient  for Z to have no marginal  value. 
10. A slightly  more general  problem  is to choose between Z  and Y given a third information  system 
Y'. However,  this reduces  to a comparison  of (Z, Y') and (Y, Y'). 
11.  9 may be referred  to as the si-relevant  partition  (Marschak  and Miyasawa  (1968)). Rather  than 
assuming  d  finite,  X, Y and Z might  alternatively  have been assumed  measurable  with respect  to some finite 
partition  of d.  Gjesdal  (1978) has attempted  to generalize  some of the results  of this section  to more  general 
action  space  and outcome  functions. 
12. Such  a decision  problem  is not part  of the agency  problem. However,  the agency  problem  is easily 
generalized  by introducing  a decision  to be made (collectively  or by the principal)  after  the signal  y is received. 
Then Y is valuable  for incentive-insurance  as well as decision  making  purposes  (see Gjesdal (1978)). Note 
that Condition  B, as defined  here, ranks  information  systems  for a fixed  value  of a. 
13. Consider  two modifications  to the contract  which  pays  the agent  E(S' I  yi) when yi is observed. One 
modification  pays  S'(z) and  amounts  to randomizing  the sharing  rule  E(S' | Y). The other  modification  deducts 
an amount  E(S' I  yi)  - S(yi) for each  signal  yi. The latter  modification  which  in this  sense employs  a deductible, 
is Pareto-superior. 
14. It is true that if the ranking  which  is being constructed  shall hold for any measure  on i,  then the 
counterexample  require  that infinite  penalties  be available. If a,  is to be enforced  with information  system 
Y, the necessary  penalty  must  approach  -X  in utility  units,  as the probability  of e1 approaches  zero. 
15. If infinite  penalties  are not available,  this probability  will have a strictly  positive  lower bound. An 
interesting  example  of less information  (according  to the ranking  by Condition  BA) being  as valuable  as more, 
is the case of conditional  investigations. (Demski and Feltham (1978), Baiman and Demski (1980a, b), 
Townsend  (1979)). Rather  than buying  the information  system Z, the information  system Y-{buy  Z with 
probability  p, use Y? otherwise}-is chosen. For incentives  Y is as good as Z (and  it is presumably  cheaper). 
It should  be kept in mind,  though,  that for Y to be as valuable  as Z for all agency  problems,  Y should  also 
enable  the agency  to share  risk  equally  well. 
16. (11) implies  Condition  A. The converse  is not true. When  (11) holds,  it is also true  that Y is ranked 
as high  as (Y, Z) by Condition  A.  Hence if there  is no risk  sharing  problem,  Y is as valuable  as (Y, Z), and  Z 
will  not have  marginal  value  given Y Holmstrom  ([1979],  Proposition  3-necessity) proves  this  result  for Y = X. 
His result  is essentially  a special  case  of Corollary  1 as observable  X is another  case of no risk-sharing  problem. 
In general  Proposition  2 may  be used to prove  converses  of Proposition  1. 
17. Grossman  and Hart (1981) also prove the sufficiency  of Condition  BA assuming  the agent's  utility 
function  is of the form: 
V(s, a)=  V1(s)V2(a)+  V3(a). 
The additive  form (as well as the multiplicative  form)  is a special  case of this. With  reference  to the discussion 
of randomization  below, it is interesting  to note that this is precisely  the class of utility  functions  for which 
risk  preferences  do not depend  on action  choice. 
18. Weiss (1976) shows that when using a linear income tax, it may be optimal  to make the tax rate 
random. The linear  income  tax model is essentially  an agency  problem  with linear  sharing  rule. However,  it 
is the imposed  linearity  which  accounts  for the efficiency  of randomization  in Weiss'  case. 
19. The likelihood  matrix  of  Y? is a column  vector of l's.  That of a randomization  is a matrix  with 
identical  rows. The Markov  matrix  is the row vector  which  is equal to the rows  of this likelihood  matrix.  The 
relationship  between imperfect  information  and randomization  is interesting:  Explicit randomizations  are 
seldom  seen, whereas  imperfect  information  is used all the time. 
20. Gjesdal  (1978) provides  a general  analysis  of this case. 
21. Formally,  the marginal  salary  increase  considered  may  be expressed  as (dh)T where T is a random 
variable  with  mean 1. 390  REVIEW  OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
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